ABSTRACTS
Carsten Allefeld, Freiburg, Germany
From Double Aspects to an Ontology of Perspectives
Modern approaches to the psychophysical problem tend to
take the domain of the material as described by the natural sciences for granted
and to seek for an explanation of the domain of the mental as emerging from the
physical world. But as Chalmers pointed out with his insistence on the "hard problem of
consciousness" [1], it is hard to see how the gap between the domain of objective
properties and that of subjective experience could be bridged by any conceivable
explanation, leading him to the assumption of two mutually irreducible aspects.
In this situation it might be helpful to turn to insights developed within a clearly different school of thought, namely that of phenomenology. Whereas classical phenomenology, quite contrary to naturalistic approaches, starts from the description of a subjectivity that is on its part constitutive for the material domain, Merleau-Ponty in his last work "The Visible and the Invisible" [2] stresses the fact that this subjectivity is situated within the physical world, and that the clear distinction and separation of the mental and the physical is just due to an overly strong abstraction.
In my talk I will outline Merleau-Ponty's alternative worldview, in which the primary difference between subjectivity and objectivity is dismissed in favor of a multitude of possible distinctions, and where the perspectivity usually associated with consciousness only, is integrated into being itself.
In this situation it might be helpful to turn to insights developed within a clearly different school of thought, namely that of phenomenology. Whereas classical phenomenology, quite contrary to naturalistic approaches, starts from the description of a subjectivity that is on its part constitutive for the material domain, Merleau-Ponty in his last work "The Visible and the Invisible" [2] stresses the fact that this subjectivity is situated within the physical world, and that the clear distinction and separation of the mental and the physical is just due to an overly strong abstraction.
In my talk I will outline Merleau-Ponty's alternative worldview, in which the primary difference between subjectivity and objectivity is dismissed in favor of a multitude of possible distinctions, and where the perspectivity usually associated with consciousness only, is integrated into being itself.
[1] D. J. Chalmers, Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness, Journal of Consciousness
Studies 2/3 (1995), 200-219.
[2] M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969.
Tito Arecchi, Firenze, Italy
Collective Brain Dynamics: From the Computational to the Semiotic Paradigm - A Eulogy of Obliviousness
Feature binding denotes how coupled neurons combine external
signals with internal memories into new coherent patterns of meaning. An external
stimulus spreads over an assembly of coupled neurons, building up a corresponding
collective state. Thus, the synchronization of spike trains of many individual
neurons is the basis of a coherent perception. In the presence of different
external stimuli, different clusters of synchronized neurons are present
within the same cortical area. The microscopic dynamics of a large number
N of coupled neurons is thus replaced by the interplay of n<<N clusters.
The n objects are the attractors of a chaotic dynamics.
The crucial fact is the dissipation of information. This means that a reading sensitive to the n collective clusters has lost the detailed information of the N components. Furthermore, the next level adds extra-information coming from the top-down influence of previous learning (semiosis). The interaction between lower and upper layer is supervised by an inspection mechanism which tries different sets of top-down hypotheses. It stops trying as soon as a matching is reached; this is the dynamical implementation of a Bayes strategy.
Information loss (obliviousness) means that coding at a higher hierarchical level is not just a computational task, but violates the statute of a Turing machine. Furthermore, the information collapse from N to n violates a temporal Bell inequality, thus inducing the suspicion that the new situation might be adequately described by a quantum formalism.
We introduce such a quantum formalism as the optimal description of a chaotic system which has undergone information loss. While the value of h holds for all the phenomena studied over 100 years in our laboratories and modeled by QED and QCD, in our case, the quantum of action a is the product of the information loss time (about 10 msec) times the energy of a single neuronal spike (about 10-13 joule). Thus we have the relation a ≈ 1019h.
Such a large value allows for long decoherence times even at room temperature, thus hinting at the possibility of quantum computation.
Leaving these quantum aspects to future investigation, we immediately appreciate the creative aspect of a non-Turing code change. Defining the complexity C of a problem as the number of bits of the computer program which solves the problem (Chaitin) and plotting C versus the information loss rate K (Kolmogorov entropy), problems expressed in terms of their elementary components have a monotonic C-K behavior. While for K=0 a computer program (BACON by Herbert Simon) can retrieve Kepler’s laws from astronomical data, for K → ∞ (Boltzmann gas) a dynamical description requires N → ∞ variables, hence C → ∞ . On the other hand, the Stosszahlansatz f2 → f1 · f1 leads to thermodynamics, which has a very low C.
The crucial fact is the dissipation of information. This means that a reading sensitive to the n collective clusters has lost the detailed information of the N components. Furthermore, the next level adds extra-information coming from the top-down influence of previous learning (semiosis). The interaction between lower and upper layer is supervised by an inspection mechanism which tries different sets of top-down hypotheses. It stops trying as soon as a matching is reached; this is the dynamical implementation of a Bayes strategy.
Information loss (obliviousness) means that coding at a higher hierarchical level is not just a computational task, but violates the statute of a Turing machine. Furthermore, the information collapse from N to n violates a temporal Bell inequality, thus inducing the suspicion that the new situation might be adequately described by a quantum formalism.
We introduce such a quantum formalism as the optimal description of a chaotic system which has undergone information loss. While the value of h holds for all the phenomena studied over 100 years in our laboratories and modeled by QED and QCD, in our case, the quantum of action a is the product of the information loss time (about 10 msec) times the energy of a single neuronal spike (about 10-13 joule). Thus we have the relation a ≈ 1019h.
Such a large value allows for long decoherence times even at room temperature, thus hinting at the possibility of quantum computation.
Leaving these quantum aspects to future investigation, we immediately appreciate the creative aspect of a non-Turing code change. Defining the complexity C of a problem as the number of bits of the computer program which solves the problem (Chaitin) and plotting C versus the information loss rate K (Kolmogorov entropy), problems expressed in terms of their elementary components have a monotonic C-K behavior. While for K=0 a computer program (BACON by Herbert Simon) can retrieve Kepler’s laws from astronomical data, for K → ∞ (Boltzmann gas) a dynamical description requires N → ∞ variables, hence C → ∞ . On the other hand, the Stosszahlansatz f2 → f1 · f1 leads to thermodynamics, which has a very low C.
Amos Arieli, Rehovot, Israel
In Search of the Real: Some Observations on the Lack of Objectivity of Sensory Perception
The brain is often described as a system of sequential stations
leading from an object that has a fixed representation to the behavioral response.
According to this classical view of feature detection, each element can be characterized
by a fixed response to a specific stimulus. However, even during well-defined cognitive
tasks, successive brain responses to repeated identical stimulations are highly variable
due to the ongoing cortical activity: even in the absence of external sensory input,
cortical activity exhibits highly structured, internally driven ongoing (spontaneous)
waves of activity. Therefore, there has been a long-standing debate whether this ongoing
activity reflects `Brain Noise', a nuisance to neural processing or, instead, 'States of Mind'
expressing the brain's internal context.
In my talk I will show the spatio-temporal organization of the internal ongoing cortical activity, its interactions with stimulus-evoked activity, and the way it affects the actual behavior. Furthermore, the results indicate that the ongoing activity is made up of ephemeral ensembles of hundreds to millions of cortical neurons organizing dynamically into instantaneous states that carry established representations of the external world. Therefore, the ongoing activity could express the brain's internal context that can influence the way we perceive the world, and may contribute to the generation of specific and meaningful behavior.
Instead of the feature detection view, I propose a dynamic theory, in which the observer's perception of reality in one instant, is interwoven into the ongoing dynamics in the brain in the following instant, which reflects expectations about the sensory input, thus shaping the intentions and actions of the observer. In such a system there is a convergence towards a specific object that is inseparable from the intentions or the actions of the viewer, and therefore the perception is neither objective nor complete. In a dynamical system such as this one, the activity never ceases and hence there is no meaning to the words beginning and end.
In my talk I will show the spatio-temporal organization of the internal ongoing cortical activity, its interactions with stimulus-evoked activity, and the way it affects the actual behavior. Furthermore, the results indicate that the ongoing activity is made up of ephemeral ensembles of hundreds to millions of cortical neurons organizing dynamically into instantaneous states that carry established representations of the external world. Therefore, the ongoing activity could express the brain's internal context that can influence the way we perceive the world, and may contribute to the generation of specific and meaningful behavior.
Instead of the feature detection view, I propose a dynamic theory, in which the observer's perception of reality in one instant, is interwoven into the ongoing dynamics in the brain in the following instant, which reflects expectations about the sensory input, thus shaping the intentions and actions of the observer. In such a system there is a convergence towards a specific object that is inseparable from the intentions or the actions of the viewer, and therefore the perception is neither objective nor complete. In a dynamical system such as this one, the activity never ceases and hence there is no meaning to the words beginning and end.
Harald Atmanspacher, Freiburg, Germany
Mind-Matter Relations: Some Key Questions and Ways to Address Them
At the end of the workshop, I will try to review the approaches and viewpoints
presented, relate them to one another, and speculate about possible conclusions and implications.
Avshalom Elitzur, Ramat-Gan, Israel
The Gap between Consciousness and Brain – as Wide as Ever
Despite the enormous progress made by the neurosciences, their impressive
success in ex-plaining behavior, thinking and emotion leaves subjective
experience itself unexplained. The first part of this lecture serves
as a primer for the famous mind-body problem. I argue that, although
the problem was originally posed by philosophers, it is an acute scientific
problem as well. In the second part, I criticize the attempt of Chalmers
to reconcile subjective experience with current neurophysiology and physics.
I present a theorem proving that no physical account of subjective experience
is possible unless taking into account a factor not yet known to physics.
Thomas Filk, Freiburg, Germany
Consciousness - Nowness - State Reduction: The Inseparable Triangle
Consciousness (in the sense of mind as opposed to matter), nowness
(a theory of the present as opposed to the physical notion of time), and the transition from
quantum mechanical superpositions to classical facts mark three cornerstones of the boundary
of present-day physics. It is argued that the three problems are intimately related and that
the solution of one of them implies at least major progress towards solutions of the other two.
In addition to their intimate relationship there are also remarkable similarities in the structures of
these problems.
Georg Franck, Wien, Austria
Presence and Reality
The mind-matter distinction involves an ontological difference.
The mode that the conscious mind exists in is mental presence. The mode matter
and radiation exist in is material reality. Mental presence is ontologically
different from both the material brain it relies on and the phenomena the
conscious mind is conscious of. There are phenomena (sense qualities, emotions,
propositional attitudes) that do not exist but by being ‘presenced’. In contrast
to such phenomena, the existence of the material brain can be accounted for without
referring to presence. The brain is real in the pure sense of material reality.
Purely real means purified from connotations of presence.
The paper explores the possibility of translating the mind-matter distinction into the ontologi-cal difference between presence and reality. In contrast to talking of mind, spirit, soul, the ontology of presence is free of metaphysical overtones. Presence is the epitome of con-creteness. Presentification or actualization is what makes the difference between the reality that the basic level of physical theory describes and the things we can watch and touch. Ac-tualization is what cuts things out of trajectories. Actualization is what turns quantum states into measured states. Presence is what distinguishes events from mere facts.
The paper points out that drawing a clear-cut distinction between presence and reality amounts to introducing an interface between the mental and the material. In contrast to real-ity, presence is susceptible to graduation and intensification. The more intensive the presen-tation, the more concrete is the impression. Things perceived are more concrete than things recollected or anticipated because they are present to a higher degree. Varying intensities are characteristic of mental presence as well as of the phenomena presencing. On either side, the degrees of freedom that the intensity varies in are energy and time. The intensity of mental presence varies with arousal and fatigue, i.e. according to a circadian cycle of energy levels in the physical brain. The intensity of the phenomena varies with the amount of mental presence allocated and with the place of time where the actualization takes place. The amount of attention allocated is a question of energy, again. The place in time where the ac-tualization takes place changes spontaneously, i.e. by way of the so-called passage of time.
The interface connecting the mental and the material is the Now. On the mental side, the Now is the (entangled?) collectivity of mental presence. On the material side, the standing Now harbors the changing event out of which the sequential order of facts emanates. The Now cannot be purely subjective since it is objective in the social sense of objectivity. On the other hand, the Now is excluded from the basic level of physical reality. The Now appears as a mediator through which material reality is given to mental presence (and vice versa?). The paper closes with deliberations as to how the traditional subject-object distinction can be re-described in terms of the novel ontology.
The paper explores the possibility of translating the mind-matter distinction into the ontologi-cal difference between presence and reality. In contrast to talking of mind, spirit, soul, the ontology of presence is free of metaphysical overtones. Presence is the epitome of con-creteness. Presentification or actualization is what makes the difference between the reality that the basic level of physical theory describes and the things we can watch and touch. Ac-tualization is what cuts things out of trajectories. Actualization is what turns quantum states into measured states. Presence is what distinguishes events from mere facts.
The paper points out that drawing a clear-cut distinction between presence and reality amounts to introducing an interface between the mental and the material. In contrast to real-ity, presence is susceptible to graduation and intensification. The more intensive the presen-tation, the more concrete is the impression. Things perceived are more concrete than things recollected or anticipated because they are present to a higher degree. Varying intensities are characteristic of mental presence as well as of the phenomena presencing. On either side, the degrees of freedom that the intensity varies in are energy and time. The intensity of mental presence varies with arousal and fatigue, i.e. according to a circadian cycle of energy levels in the physical brain. The intensity of the phenomena varies with the amount of mental presence allocated and with the place of time where the actualization takes place. The amount of attention allocated is a question of energy, again. The place in time where the ac-tualization takes place changes spontaneously, i.e. by way of the so-called passage of time.
The interface connecting the mental and the material is the Now. On the mental side, the Now is the (entangled?) collectivity of mental presence. On the material side, the standing Now harbors the changing event out of which the sequential order of facts emanates. The Now cannot be purely subjective since it is objective in the social sense of objectivity. On the other hand, the Now is excluded from the basic level of physical reality. The Now appears as a mediator through which material reality is given to mental presence (and vice versa?). The paper closes with deliberations as to how the traditional subject-object distinction can be re-described in terms of the novel ontology.
Walter Freeman, Berkeley, USA
Sourcing Organizing Concepts for Neocortical Dynamic Data from Many-Body Physics
Neural
activity patterns related to behavior occur at
all scales in time and space from the atomic and molecular to the whole
brain.
Patterns form through interactions in both directions, so that
the impact of
transmitter molecule release can be analyzed upwardly through synapses,
dendrites, neurons, populations and brain systems to behavior, and
control of
that release can be described step-wise through top-down
transformations. We
explore the feasibility of organizing and interpreting
neurophysiological data
in the context of many-body physics by using tools that physicists have
devised
to analyze comparable hierarchies in other fields of science. We focus
on a
mesoscopic level that offers a multi-step pathway between the
microscopic
functions of neurons and the macroscopic functions of brain systems
revealed by
hemodynamic imaging. We apply the Hilbert transform to
electroencephalographic
(EEG) recordings from high-density electrode arrays fixed on epidural
surfaces
of primary sensory and limbic areas in rabbits and cats trained to
discriminate
conditioned stimuli in the various modalities. The resulting
high
spatiotemporal resolution of EEG signals gives evidence for diverse
intermittent spatial patterns of amplitude (AM) and phase
modulations (PM) of
carrier waves that repeatedly re-synchronize in the beta and gamma
ranges at
near zero time lags over long distances. The dominant mechanism for
neural
interactions by axodendritic synaptic transmission should impose
distance-dependent delays on the EEG oscillations owing to finite
propagation
velocities. It does not. EEGs instead show evidence for anomalous
dispersion:
the existence in neural populations of a low velocity range of
information and
energy transfers, and a high velocity range of the spread of phase
transitions.
This distinction labels the phenomenon but does not explain it. We
explore the
this and related phenomena using concepts of energy
dissipation, the
maintenance by cortex of multiple ground states corresponding
to AM patterns,
and the exclusive selection by spontaneous breakdown of symmetry of
single
states in cinematographic sequences.
Freeman W.J. (2005) Origin, structure, and
role of
background EEG activity. Part 3. Neural frame classification. Clin.
Neurophysiol. 116 (5): 1118-1129.
http://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S1388245705000064
Freeman, W.J. (2005) A
field-theoretic approach to understanding scale-free neocortical
dynamics.
Special Issue on "Nonlinear spatio-temporal neural dynamics -
experiments
and theoretical models". Biol. Cybern. 92/6: 350-359.
Freeman WJ, Holmes MD (2005) Metastability, instability, and state
transition
in neocortex. Neural Networks.
http://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0893608005001085
Kozma R, Puljic M, Balister P,
Bollabás B, Freeman WJ. (2005) Phase transitions in the
neuropercolation model
of neural populations with mixed local and non-local interactions.
Biol.
Cybern. 92: 367-379.
Freeman WJ, Vitiello G (2005)
Nonlinear brain dynamics and many-body field dynamics. http://www.arxiv.org/find
[Freeman] q-bio.OT/0511037
Freeman WJ, Vitiello G (2006)
Nonlinear brain dynamics as macroscopic manifestation of underlying
many-body
field dynamics. Physics of Life Reviews, in press.
Peter beim Graben, Potsdam, Germany
Contextual Emergence of Mental States from Neurodynamics
The
concept of contextual emergence has been proposed
as a non-reductive relation between different levels of
description of
physical and other systems where the lower level description
comprises
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the higher level
description [1].
These are supplied by contingent contexts obeying particular stability
conditions.
We shall show that Chalmers' definition of "neural correlates of
consciousness" (NCCs) [2] can be complemented in terms of contextual
emergence, where a neural system is necessary for the emergence of an
NCC. The
sufficient conditions are then provided by contextually given
"phenomenal
families" [2] of mental observables that partition the state space of
the
neural system [3] in classes of "epistemically equivalent" states
[4]. These equivalence classes can be regarded as contextually emergent
neural
correlates if the required stability conditions for the mental dynamics
hold.
This is the case if the resulting dynamics is a Markov chain either
with
periodic behaviour or possessing a mixing measure [5]. We argue that
compatible
mental descriptions, which are also topologically equivalent with the
neurodynamical description [6], emerge if the partition of the
neural phase
space is generating [4,5]. If this is not the case, mental descriptions
are
incompatible or complementary. An example for the latter case taken
from
syntactic language processing will be discussed [7].
[1] H. Atmanspacher & R.
C. Bishop.
Stability conditions in contextual emergence. Chaos and Complexity
Letters, in
press.
[2] D. Chalmers. What is a neural
correlate of consciousness? In T. Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of
Consciousness, Cambridge:
MIT Press, pp.17-39, 2000.
[3] J. Fell. Identifying neural
correlates of consciousness: The state space approach. Consciousness
and
Cognition, 13:709-729, 2004.
[4]
P. beim Graben & H. Atmanspacher. Complementarity
in classical dynamical systems. Foundations of Physics,
doi:10.1007/s10701-005-9013-0, 2006.
[5]
H. Atmanspacher & P. beim Graben. Contextual
emergence of mental states from neurodynamics. Chaos and Complexity
Letters, in
press.
[6] T. Metzinger. Being No One. Cambridge:
MIT Press,
2003.
[7] P. beim Graben. Incompatible
implementations of physical symbol systems. Mind and Matter, 2(2):
29-51, 2004.
Basil Hiley, London, United Kingdom
Process and the Algebra of Time
The measurement of time requires two elements: a recurrent process which is
reversible and an irreversible process in which to record periods in the
recurrent processes. I regard quantum mechanics as requiring two times: a
time for the development of potentialities and a time development for
describing actual occurrences. I will present a mathematical model based on
a bialgebra that will attempt to unite these two processes in one structure.
I will discuss the general implication of such a model.
Scott Jordan, Normal, USA and Bielefeld, Germany
(Proto-) Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems
The concept of contextual emergence was introduced as a specific kind of
emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a
lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability criteria at
the lower level, which simultaneously afford the emergence of novelty at the higher level.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose that (proto-) consciousness constitutes a
contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption of this position
is that living organisms constitute self-sustaining embodiments of the contingent contexts that
afford their emergence. I propose, that the emergence of such systems constitutes the emergence
of content-bearing systems because the lower-level processes of such systems give rise to and
sustain the macro-level whole (i.e., body) in which they are nested, while the emergent
macro-level whole constitutes the context in which the lower-level processes can be for something
(i.e., be functional). Such embodied functionality is necessarily and naturally about the contexts
it has embodied. It is this notion of self-sustaining embodied aboutness that I propose constitutes
a type of content capable of evolving into consciousness.
Günter Mahler, Stuttgart, Germany
Mind (at) the Interface: A Metaphor from Physics
It is often taken for granted that the brain is the carrier of the mind, similar to a computer,
a physical device on which a program can be run. This thinking leads to the expectation that increasing
the complexity of artificial information processing systems should eventually give rise to mental state
analogies or even "consciousness" of those very systems.
Here it is proposed that "mental state dynamics" might better be seen as an interface property: a property of the brain embedded in its body and connected to the outside world. According to this hypothesis an isolated brain (if in some sense still alife) could not have mental states. I will discuss in some detail embedded quantum systems which substantiate this idea: Effective dynamical features which, simple as they appear, can only be explained taking the environment into account. Interesting recent examples can be found in the realm of so-called nanomachines, in particular quantum-thermodynamic machines.
These call for a quantum description. As a result, however, an individual spin acting as the “working gas” can be made to exercise Carnot cycles, a seemingly classical dynamical pattern known from macroscopic steam engines. This functionality is completely alien to the inherent dynamical repertoire of such an elementary object; it would not be implementable on a working gas consisting of a single classical particle instead.
Likewise, I tentatively argue, that mind state evolution may be incompatible with the dynamical repertoire of an isolated brain: The pertinent dynamics does not occur within the system proper, but rather on its interface, thus challenging the conventional computer metaphor. Quantum mechanics may have its say, but not necessarily in the form of spectacular entanglement effects.
Here it is proposed that "mental state dynamics" might better be seen as an interface property: a property of the brain embedded in its body and connected to the outside world. According to this hypothesis an isolated brain (if in some sense still alife) could not have mental states. I will discuss in some detail embedded quantum systems which substantiate this idea: Effective dynamical features which, simple as they appear, can only be explained taking the environment into account. Interesting recent examples can be found in the realm of so-called nanomachines, in particular quantum-thermodynamic machines.
These call for a quantum description. As a result, however, an individual spin acting as the “working gas” can be made to exercise Carnot cycles, a seemingly classical dynamical pattern known from macroscopic steam engines. This functionality is completely alien to the inherent dynamical repertoire of such an elementary object; it would not be implementable on a working gas consisting of a single classical particle instead.
Likewise, I tentatively argue, that mind state evolution may be incompatible with the dynamical repertoire of an isolated brain: The pertinent dynamics does not occur within the system proper, but rather on its interface, thus challenging the conventional computer metaphor. Quantum mechanics may have its say, but not necessarily in the form of spectacular entanglement effects.
F. Tonner, G. Mahler: Quantum limit of the Carnot engine, Fortschr. Physik, submitted (2006)
M. Henrich, M. Michel, G. Mahler: Small quantum information networks operating
as thermodynamic machines, Phys. Rev. Lett., submitted (2006)
F. Tonner, G. Mahler: Autonomous quantum thermodynamic machines, Phys. Rev. E 72, 066118 (2005)
H. Schmidt, G. Mahler: Control of local relaxation behavior in closed bipartite quantum systems,
Phys. Rev. E 72, 016117 (2005)
G. Mahler, J. Gemmer, M. Michel: Emergence of thermodynamic behavior within
composite quantum systems, Physica E 29, 53 (2005)
G. Mahler: The partitioned quantum universe: Entanglement and the emergence of
functionality, Mind and Matter 2(2), 67 (2004)
Elisha Moses, Rehovot, Israel
The World View of Cultured Neural Networks
I will review some conclusions
that can be drawn from
recent measurements on physical properties of one and two dimensional
neuronal
networks. Information transport is governed by connectivity, so that
the coding
of external signals and the network's internal representation are
dominated by
local processing. The observed percolation transition is used to obtain
a comparison to networks that are
likely to occur in the real brain.
Albrecht von Müller, München, Germany
From Specious to Spacious Present - On the Categorical Implications of Assuming a Role for the Present in Physics
In classical and relativistic physics there is no real role for the present.
It is argued that this is a direct consequence of the underlying categorical
apparatus implying a “block universe” in which nothing genuinely new can take
place, i.e. something that for basic reasons could not be anticipated.
In quantum physics things are different. The impossibility of local hidden variables implies the occurrence of genuine novelty. This, however, has major implications for the concepts of time and reality. The new can take place only in the present, not in the past, nor in the future. A present in which something can take place, however, cannot be a merely notional point separating past and future. Instead, a "richer" notion and an "objective" role of the present are needed. The present becomes a time-space which is expanded - but not yet sequentially structured in itself. The sequential order of time becomes applicable only when the emergent reality has consolidated in the form of facts.
A categorical framework is developed which allows for such richer notions of time and reality, including an objective role of the present. It is shown that this framework can be formulated in a way that is consistent with the classical notions of time and reality, which can be derived as limiting cases for the factual aspect of reality.
In quantum physics things are different. The impossibility of local hidden variables implies the occurrence of genuine novelty. This, however, has major implications for the concepts of time and reality. The new can take place only in the present, not in the past, nor in the future. A present in which something can take place, however, cannot be a merely notional point separating past and future. Instead, a "richer" notion and an "objective" role of the present are needed. The present becomes a time-space which is expanded - but not yet sequentially structured in itself. The sequential order of time becomes applicable only when the emergent reality has consolidated in the form of facts.
A categorical framework is developed which allows for such richer notions of time and reality, including an objective role of the present. It is shown that this framework can be formulated in a way that is consistent with the classical notions of time and reality, which can be derived as limiting cases for the factual aspect of reality.
Eliano Pessa, Pavia, Italy
Phase Transitions in Cognitive Behavior and Their Description by Neural Network Models and Quantum Brain Theory
A conspicuous body of experimental evidence as well as of everyday
observations shows the occurrence, in human and animal cognitive
behavior, of deep structural changes which can be interpreted as phase
transitions, akin to the ones taking place in the physical world.
Typical examples of these phenomena are decision making, concept
learning, memory recall, dot stereogram perception, insight in problem
solving. In order to describe them in a biologically plausible way a
number of neural network models have been introduced. They draw their
inspiration from the neuronal dynamics occurring in the brain, supposed
to be underlying the cognitive phenomena under consideration.
Considered as nonlinear dynamical systems with a large number of degrees
of freedom,
such neural networks are associated with a complex state space structure
and different kinds of attractors undergoing bifurcation phenomena.
These phenomena can be interpreted as phase transitions in the cognitive
system.
However, mathematical, biological and psychological arguments evidence the weakness of this interpretation. Namely the presence of intrinsic noise, ubiquitous in all biological systems, makes generally unstable, with respect to fluctuations, all structures generated by traditional bifurcation mechanisms. This, in turn, contradicts the fact that most structural changes associated to cognitive phase transitions are endowed with a remarkable stability against perturbations, even of large amplitude. Thus, in order to account for this circumstance, one needs to resort to a different modelling approach based on quantum field theory (QFT), to microscopic phenomena taking place within the brain. In this regard it is to be remarked that only QFT (and not classical physics nor quantum mechanics) gives rise to different, inequivalent representations of the same physical system, which can be associated to its different possible phases. Moreover, phase transitions are endowed with a so-called generalized rigidity, as they entail the occurrence of collective ordering modes, the Goldstone bosons, keeping stable against perturbations the coherence of the new structure arising from the transition itself. If QFT models are endowed with a dissipative dynamics, describing the interaction with the environment, an infinite multiplicity of different coherent brain states is allowed.
The problem now is how to reconcile the advantages offered by this approach with the appealing features of some neural network models, which seem to constitute the best and simplest language for describing brain phenomena underlying cognitive behavior. In this regard two different approaches are compared: one searching for a generalization of neural network models so as to endow them with features typical of QFT, and another one trying to show that some kinds of neural networks are already equivalent to QFT models, or can be reformulated in their language. Some arguments favouring the second approach are introduced and their consequences for brain theories and psychology are briefly sketched.
However, mathematical, biological and psychological arguments evidence the weakness of this interpretation. Namely the presence of intrinsic noise, ubiquitous in all biological systems, makes generally unstable, with respect to fluctuations, all structures generated by traditional bifurcation mechanisms. This, in turn, contradicts the fact that most structural changes associated to cognitive phase transitions are endowed with a remarkable stability against perturbations, even of large amplitude. Thus, in order to account for this circumstance, one needs to resort to a different modelling approach based on quantum field theory (QFT), to microscopic phenomena taking place within the brain. In this regard it is to be remarked that only QFT (and not classical physics nor quantum mechanics) gives rise to different, inequivalent representations of the same physical system, which can be associated to its different possible phases. Moreover, phase transitions are endowed with a so-called generalized rigidity, as they entail the occurrence of collective ordering modes, the Goldstone bosons, keeping stable against perturbations the coherence of the new structure arising from the transition itself. If QFT models are endowed with a dissipative dynamics, describing the interaction with the environment, an infinite multiplicity of different coherent brain states is allowed.
The problem now is how to reconcile the advantages offered by this approach with the appealing features of some neural network models, which seem to constitute the best and simplest language for describing brain phenomena underlying cognitive behavior. In this regard two different approaches are compared: one searching for a generalization of neural network models so as to endow them with features typical of QFT, and another one trying to show that some kinds of neural networks are already equivalent to QFT models, or can be reformulated in their language. Some arguments favouring the second approach are introduced and their consequences for brain theories and psychology are briefly sketched.
Arkady Plotnitsky, West Lafayette, USA
Why Not Quantum: Three Conceptions of Chaos, Nature of Thought and the Physics of the Brain
This paper takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari’s insight, advanced in What is Philosophy?, that human thought
should be understood through its confrontation with chaos, a great enemy of thought,
but also its greatest friend and its greatest ally in its struggle against opinion,
doxa, always an enemy only. By contrast, such human endeavors as art, science,
and philosophy are manifestations of thought as a confrontation with chaos.
Deleuze and Guattari proceed to argue that, in order to explain the nature of
thought as this confrontation, the workings of the brain itself and, hence,
our scientific understanding of the brain should be rethought accordingly.
For, they contend, most current neurological theories only approach the
brain as a system for processing of opinions by the mind and not, as it
should be, as the system responsible for the emergence of the mind that
creates thought. The latter and hence also art, science, and philosophy
and, thus, what is most essential to thinking could, accordingly, never be
explained by such theories.
The paper will examine this (largely hypothetical) argument, first, by extending Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of chaos to a more complex conceptual architecture, defined by three concepts of chaos - chaos as the incomprehensible, chaos as chance and disorder, and chaos as the virtual. (Deleuze and Guattari only use the idea of chaos as the virtual.) The paper will also discuss the relationships between thought and consciousness from this perspective, by arguing that thought has primarily to do with the unconscious rather than consciousness. Then the paper will address the question of how well some current theories of the brain’s functioning are suited to address the workings of thought in this sense, and in particular whether some among the quantum-theoretical approaches to the brain (which are not considered by Deleuze and Guattari) may be helpful in this task. The potential significance of these theories for our understanding of the brain as the system that gives rise to the mind capable of creating and working with thought is especially intriguing because they, specifically quantum field theory, relate our interaction with quantum objects and processes (via measuring instruments and our minds, and specifically consciousness) to all three concepts of chaos just mentioned.
The paper will examine this (largely hypothetical) argument, first, by extending Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of chaos to a more complex conceptual architecture, defined by three concepts of chaos - chaos as the incomprehensible, chaos as chance and disorder, and chaos as the virtual. (Deleuze and Guattari only use the idea of chaos as the virtual.) The paper will also discuss the relationships between thought and consciousness from this perspective, by arguing that thought has primarily to do with the unconscious rather than consciousness. Then the paper will address the question of how well some current theories of the brain’s functioning are suited to address the workings of thought in this sense, and in particular whether some among the quantum-theoretical approaches to the brain (which are not considered by Deleuze and Guattari) may be helpful in this task. The potential significance of these theories for our understanding of the brain as the system that gives rise to the mind capable of creating and working with thought is especially intriguing because they, specifically quantum field theory, relate our interaction with quantum objects and processes (via measuring instruments and our minds, and specifically consciousness) to all three concepts of chaos just mentioned.
Hans Primas, Zürich, Switzerland
Non-Boolean Descriptions for Mind-Matter Problems
Boolean descriptions play a privileged role in science. Since they arise from partitions of reality
that we create, they cannot cover the full range of our capacities of insight. To comprehend reality
without partitions and its associated holistic correlations, non-Boolean descriptions are compulsory.
Such descriptions require a locally Boolean structure so that aspects of the unpartitioned reality can
be perceived by projections onto empirically accessible Boolean reference frames.
Even though quantum theory is the paradigmatic example of a successful non-Boolean theory, it would be inappropriate to adhere to its traditional mathematical formulation in terms of Hilbert spaces or algebras of observables for phenomena beyond physics. Since classification is at the beginning of any scientific activity, corresponding operational descriptions are related to an inherently Boolean concept. The fact that there are incompatible classifications can be conceived in terms of the well-developed and rich mathematical structure of locally Boolean but globally non-Boolean manifolds.
In contrast to classical Boolean science, non-Boolean descriptions do not refer to an atomistic ontology. The main problem of a genuinely non-Boolean description is an appropriate partition of the considered universe of discourse. I adopt the view that such partitions are neither a priori given nor determined by first principles. Examples referring to complementary descriptions of material and mental phenomena and their associated holistic correlations will be discussed: the problem of distinguishing mind and matter, the complementarity of mental and physical time. Finally I will mention problems which seem to be outside the range of currently available approaches.
Even though quantum theory is the paradigmatic example of a successful non-Boolean theory, it would be inappropriate to adhere to its traditional mathematical formulation in terms of Hilbert spaces or algebras of observables for phenomena beyond physics. Since classification is at the beginning of any scientific activity, corresponding operational descriptions are related to an inherently Boolean concept. The fact that there are incompatible classifications can be conceived in terms of the well-developed and rich mathematical structure of locally Boolean but globally non-Boolean manifolds.
In contrast to classical Boolean science, non-Boolean descriptions do not refer to an atomistic ontology. The main problem of a genuinely non-Boolean description is an appropriate partition of the considered universe of discourse. I adopt the view that such partitions are neither a priori given nor determined by first principles. Examples referring to complementary descriptions of material and mental phenomena and their associated holistic correlations will be discussed: the problem of distinguishing mind and matter, the complementarity of mental and physical time. Finally I will mention problems which seem to be outside the range of currently available approaches.
Paavo Pylkkänen, Skövde, Sweden
Implicate order and the spatio-temporal structure of consciousness
Conscious experience has typically a spatio-temporal structure, as emphasized by Kant, the later phenomenologists,
and more recently by various researchers in consciousness studies (e.g. van Gulick, Velmans, Revonsuo, Metzinger,
Dainton and Lehar). But how does such spatio-temporal structure of conscious experience arise, and how does it
relate to the spatio-temporal structure of the "real physical world"? The advocates of direct perception hold
that in ordinary perception we somehow perceive the external world directly, thus making superfluous the idea
that conscious experience has spatio-temporal structure over and above that of the external world. But conscious
experiences connected with processes like dreaming, hallucinations and imagination strongly suggests that
consciousness at least in those states involves a construction of a perceptual world which typically has
spatio-temporal structure.
Thus a theory of consciousness needs to address the nature and origin of such structure. One framework in which to discuss spatio-temporal structure - whether of consciousness or of the "real physical world" – is provided by Bohm’s notion of the "implicate order". This framework does not take space and time as fundamental but rather sees them as derivative orders which can be unfolded from a more fundamental ground in which a so called "implicate" or "enfolded" order prevails. In physics this idea connects with the notion of pre-space, a notion which is proposed to help to tackle the formidable problems of relating quantum theory and general relativity to each other. For example, Bohm and Hiley (1984) generalized the Penrose twistor theory to a Clifford algebra, paving the way for a description which allows continuous space-time to emerge from a deeper pre-space they call an implicate order.
Similar ideas and mathematical tools might also be useful when trying to understand the origin and nature of the spatio-temporal structure of conscious experience. Indeed, Bohm himself proposed that the "explicate" space and time that we consciously experience is likewise projected from its enfoldment in deeper implicate orders (Bohm 1986). To connect this idea to neuroscience it is particularly relevant to consider Pribram’s holographic theory of neural memory, as holography (where information about the whole scene is enfolded in each region of the hologram) is one paradigmatic example of the implicate order. Bohm’s broader mind-body ontology might further throw some new light upon the question of whether we perceive the external world directly or whether this perception instead takes place indirectly via the "virtual reality" of consciousness.
Thus a theory of consciousness needs to address the nature and origin of such structure. One framework in which to discuss spatio-temporal structure - whether of consciousness or of the "real physical world" – is provided by Bohm’s notion of the "implicate order". This framework does not take space and time as fundamental but rather sees them as derivative orders which can be unfolded from a more fundamental ground in which a so called "implicate" or "enfolded" order prevails. In physics this idea connects with the notion of pre-space, a notion which is proposed to help to tackle the formidable problems of relating quantum theory and general relativity to each other. For example, Bohm and Hiley (1984) generalized the Penrose twistor theory to a Clifford algebra, paving the way for a description which allows continuous space-time to emerge from a deeper pre-space they call an implicate order.
Similar ideas and mathematical tools might also be useful when trying to understand the origin and nature of the spatio-temporal structure of conscious experience. Indeed, Bohm himself proposed that the "explicate" space and time that we consciously experience is likewise projected from its enfoldment in deeper implicate orders (Bohm 1986). To connect this idea to neuroscience it is particularly relevant to consider Pribram’s holographic theory of neural memory, as holography (where information about the whole scene is enfolded in each region of the hologram) is one paradigmatic example of the implicate order. Bohm’s broader mind-body ontology might further throw some new light upon the question of whether we perceive the external world directly or whether this perception instead takes place indirectly via the "virtual reality" of consciousness.
Bohm, D. (1986) ”Time, the implicate order and pre-space”, in D.Griffin ed. Physics and the Ultimate
Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine and Process Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press.
Bohm, D. and Hiley, B.J. (1984) “Generalization of the twistor to Clifford algebras as a basis for
geometry”, Revista Brasileira de Fisica Volume Especial Os 70 anos de Mário Schönberg, pp.1-26.
Pylkkänen, P. (forthcoming in 2006) Mind, Matter and the Implicate Order. Heidelberg: Springer, Frontiers Collection.
Hartmann Römer, Freiburg, Germany
Complementarity of Process and Substance
Process philosophy endeavors to replace the classical
ontology of substances by a process ontology centered
on the notions of change and transition. We argue
that the substantial and processual approach are mutually
complementary in the sense of a generalized quantum theory
which is not limited to physical phenomena.
From this point of view, restricting oneself to
either substance ontology or process ontology would be as
ill-advised as exclusively relying on position or
momentum representations in physics. A new view on
Zeno's paradox lends itself. The meaning of a
"mental energy" observable, complementary to "internal time",
and its relationship to acategorial states
of the human mind will be tentatively discussed.
Marlan Scully, College Station, Texas and Princeton, New Jersey, USA
The External Observer in Quantum Mechanics: From Maxwell's Demon and Wigner's Friend to Quantum Eraser and Pauli's Spiritual Complementarity
We often hear phrases like "quantum weirdness" and "the strange world of the quantum." What is not so
widely advertised is that quantum mechanics can (and does) shed light on problems like the Maxwell
demon paradox of thermodynamics [1], the seemingly "spiritual" nature of information, and
even, perhaps, new insights into the existence of Mind and (some say) the ways of God! The
common denominator of all this is the fact that information is a real physical quantity. Information
is more than something in our mind. It is the essence of (and in many ways closely related to)
entropy [2]. Our theme is that information science and quantum physics are closely related.
By focusing on entropy, information, and observation [3], we gain insight into the strange ways
of our quantum universe.
[1]Scully, MO, Rostovtsev, Y, Sariyanni, ZE, Zubairy, MS "Using quantum erasure to exorcize Maxwell's
demon: I. Concepts and context" Physica E 29 (1-2): 29-39 OCT 2005.
[2]Scully, MO, "Extracting Work from a single Thermal Bath via Quantum Negentropy", Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 220601 (2001).
[3]Aharonov, Y, Zubairy, MS "Time and the quantum: Erasing the past and impacting the future"
Science 307 (5711), 875-879 FEB 11 2005.
William Seager, Scarborough, Canada
Time, Consciousness and Theories of Consciousness
Time, and its relation to conscious experience, has always been
philosophically puzzling and the advance of science has not made it any easier to
understand. It is curious that the most striking feature of time as experienced,
temporal flow, presence and directional asymmetry, are all threatened by fairly
central tenets of natural science. I aim to explore these puzzles, and raise an
especially peculiar issue that involves consciousness and the directedness of time.
I will contend that these considerations might have an impact on a range of
theories of consciousness and mind in general.
Henry Stapp, Berkeley, USA
Whitehead, James, and Quantum Physics
I shall first describe the beautiful fit of the ideas of Alfred North Whitehead
and William James with the concepts of Relativistic Quantum Field theory developed by S. Tomonaga and
J. Schwinger. The central concept is a set of happenings each of which is assigned a space-time region;
that this growing set of non-overlapping regions fill out a growing space-time region that advances into
the still-uncreated and yet-to-be-fixed future; and that each such happening has both experiential aspects
and physical aspects, which are jointly needed to generate the advance into the future. This conception is
useful in passing from the pragmatic interpretation of science to a putative understanding of the reality
beyond phenomena, and of our role within it. The Jamesian ideas about attention and volition are naturally
implementable within this framework, and make us into agents that can act efficaciously upon the physical
world on the basis of felt values, rational reasons, and conscious understandings.
Jack A. Tuszynski, Avner Priel, Horacio F. Cantiello, Edmonton, Canada / Charlestown, USA
Electrodynamic Signaling by the Dendritic Cytoskeleton: Towards an Intracellular Information Processing Model
A novel model for information processing in dendrites is proposed based on electrodynamic signaling
mediated by the cytoskeleton. Our working hypothesis is that the dendritic cytoskeleton, including both
microtubules (MTs) and actin filaments plays an active role in computations affecting neuronal function.
These cytoskeletal elements are affected by, and in turn regulate, a key element of neuronal information
processing, namely, dendritic ion channel activity. We present a molecular dynamics description of the C-termini
protruding from the surface of a MT that reveals the existence of several conformational states, which lead to
collective dynamical properties of the neuronal cytoskeleton. Furthermore, these collective states of the C-termini
on MTs have a significant effect on ionic condensation and ion cloud propagation with physical similarities to those
recently found in actin-filaments and microtubules. We report recent experimental findings concerning both intrinsic
and ionic conductivities of microfilaments and microtubules which strongly support our hypothesis about internal
processing capabilities in neurons. Our ultimate objective is to provide an integrated view of these phenomena in a
bottom-up scheme, demonstrating that ionic wave interactions and propagation along cytoskeletal structures impacts
channel functions, and thus neuronal computational capabilities.
Acknowledgments: This research was supported by NSERC, MITACS, PIMS, US Department of Defense, Technology Innovations, LLC and Oncovista, LLC.
Dieter Vaitl and Ulrich Ott, Giessen, Germany
Multiple Altered States of Consciousness Require a Multiplicity of Scientific Approaches
Empirical studies and recently developed neurobiological
concepts of altered states of consciousness (ASC) (Vaitl et al., 2005) have
demonstrated that consciousness can be altered by a multitude of factors ranging
from structurally and functionally compromised brain activity to naturally occurring
or experimentally induced changes in cortical arousal, sensory stimulation, cognitive
processes, and self-control. Accordingly, research on ASC requires the cooperation of
several scientific disciplines and the integrated application of their methods and
concepts, incorporating molecular genetics, morphometric analyses of brain structures,
multimodal functional brain imaging techniques, and reliable phenomenological
and psychometric assessment.
The phenomenology of ASC can be described by various neuropsychologically conceptualized dimensions, such as changes in time sense, attention span, self-awareness, and body image and the faculty of getting absorbed. It is obvious that there is a wide variety of inter-individual differences with regard to these dimensions. We have found that the ability to enter ASC is rooted to a significant degree in genetic variations of certain neurotransmitter system and the size of brain structures, especially of the anterior cingulate cortex. This key structure is the focus of a functional model of absorption states and hypnotic susceptibility. In addition, electrophysiological and brain imaging studies have revealed different neural structures en-gaged in general alterations of information processing (e.g. hypofrontality) and, in particular, of allocating attention. The cortical dynamics underlying the onset, persistence, and termina-tion of these distinctly altered brain functions remain to be elucidated.
The phenomenology of ASC can be described by various neuropsychologically conceptualized dimensions, such as changes in time sense, attention span, self-awareness, and body image and the faculty of getting absorbed. It is obvious that there is a wide variety of inter-individual differences with regard to these dimensions. We have found that the ability to enter ASC is rooted to a significant degree in genetic variations of certain neurotransmitter system and the size of brain structures, especially of the anterior cingulate cortex. This key structure is the focus of a functional model of absorption states and hypnotic susceptibility. In addition, electrophysiological and brain imaging studies have revealed different neural structures en-gaged in general alterations of information processing (e.g. hypofrontality) and, in particular, of allocating attention. The cortical dynamics underlying the onset, persistence, and termina-tion of these distinctly altered brain functions remain to be elucidated.
Vaitl et al. (2005): Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 131, 98-127.
Max Velmans, London, United Kingdom
Psychophysical Nature: A View from Psychology and Physics
The relation of consciousness to matter and in particular to the
brain has been an enduring puzzle in both psychology and physics.
Ironically, theories that posit a causal role for consciousness within
physics (e.g. in some interpretations of quantum mechanics) tend to be
dualist-interactionist, whereas psychological and philosophical theories of
the mind/body relationship tend to favour reductionist forms of physicalism
or functionalism. There are good reasons to argue that neither of these
(opposed) approaches can be made to work. Dual-aspect monism appears to
offer a viable alternative and in this paper I discuss versions of this
that have been developed in psychology (Velmans 1991, 2002), philosophy
(Chalmers 1996) and in physics, in unpublished letters by Pauli, recently
reported and elaborated by Atmanspacher and Primas (2006). In this paper I
evaluate the similarities and divergences between these three approaches
and argue that two of them offer the possibility of genuine progress and
genuine convergence between psychology and physics.
H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas (2006), Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(3),
5-50.
D. Chalmers (1996), The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press.
M. Velmans (1991), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4), 651-669, 702-726.
M. Velmans (2002), Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(11), 3-29, 69-95.
Giuseppe Vitiello, Salerno, Italy
Macroscopic Manifestation of Many-Body Field Theory and Nonlinear Brain Dynamics
The study of brain functions in animal and human subjects requires observations and measurements of the brain activity and the
formulation of dynamical models describing the observed behavior of neural populations, axons, dendrites, glia and cell bodies.
We can describe brain functions at higher levels by using the tools provided by classical physics and statistical mechanics,
with the associated mathematical machinery of algebraic methods and of sets of coupled differential equations. The
achievements we have thus reached have enabled us to recognize and document the physical states of brains, the
dynamics of neurons, the functions of membranes and organelles comprising their parts, and the molecular and ionic
ingredients that constitute the basic neural machinery of brain function. We also observe, however, brain states
which are characterized by coordinated oscillation of populations of neurons that are changing rapidly with the
evolution of the meaningful relationship between the subject and its environment, established and maintained
by active perception, which are not readily amenable to description either with classical integrodifferential
equations or the matrix algebras of neural networks.
Thus, we are led to conclude that classical tools such as, e.g., classical nonlinear dynamics and classical statistical mechanics, do not suffice. We then turn to the mathematical machinery of dissipative many-body field theory that enables us to describe phase transitions in distributed nonlinear media having innumerable co-existing and overlapping ground states, their degree of coherence and ordering, the dynamical origin of long range correlations, their rapid and efficient formation, their stability. The adoption of such a quantum field theoretic approach enables us to model the whole cerebral hemisphere and its hierarchy of components down to the atomic level as a fully integrated macroscopic quantum system, namely as a macroscopic system which is a quantum system not in the trivial sense that it is made, like all existing matter, by quantum components such as atoms and molecules, but in the sense that some of its macroscopic properties cannot be described without recourse to quantum dynamics. One of the merits of the dissipative many-body model consists in the fact that the classicality of nonlinear, chaotic dynamics is derivable from it.
Thus, we are led to conclude that classical tools such as, e.g., classical nonlinear dynamics and classical statistical mechanics, do not suffice. We then turn to the mathematical machinery of dissipative many-body field theory that enables us to describe phase transitions in distributed nonlinear media having innumerable co-existing and overlapping ground states, their degree of coherence and ordering, the dynamical origin of long range correlations, their rapid and efficient formation, their stability. The adoption of such a quantum field theoretic approach enables us to model the whole cerebral hemisphere and its hierarchy of components down to the atomic level as a fully integrated macroscopic quantum system, namely as a macroscopic system which is a quantum system not in the trivial sense that it is made, like all existing matter, by quantum components such as atoms and molecules, but in the sense that some of its macroscopic properties cannot be described without recourse to quantum dynamics. One of the merits of the dissipative many-body model consists in the fact that the classicality of nonlinear, chaotic dynamics is derivable from it.
E. Pessa and G. Vitiello, Mind and Matter 1, 59 (2003); Int. J. Mod. Phys. B 18, 841 (2004).
W.J. Freeman and G. Vitiello, Physics of Life Reviews, in print.
Jiri Wackermann, Freiburg, Germany
Measure of Time: A Meeting Point of Psychophysics and Fundamental Physics
The duality of time as (i) a dimension of subjective experience,
and (ii) a dimension of the physical description of the world, has permanently attracted
the attention of physicists and philosophers. Psychophysics attempts to construct scales
of “subjec-tive time” while taking the clock time of physics for granted. However,
the problem of a “uniform measure of time” occurs in both fields of research.
We present the “dual klepsydra model” of internal time representation [1,2], yielding a so-called “klepsydraic reproduction function” (KRF) that matches experimental data from human subjects with good accuracy. Considering abstract clocks as duration reproduction systems, we study properties of reproduction functions needed for a uniform time measure. We show that the KRF meets conditions (serial additivity, rational divisibility) required for a 'weakly uniform' time scale.
Finally, we draw parallels between the problem of uniform time in psychophysics, and a formally similar problem occurring in the “kinematic relativity theory” [3,4]. Whether this parallelism is merely contingent or indicates a deeper “rationality of Nature” will be left as a subject for speculation.
We present the “dual klepsydra model” of internal time representation [1,2], yielding a so-called “klepsydraic reproduction function” (KRF) that matches experimental data from human subjects with good accuracy. Considering abstract clocks as duration reproduction systems, we study properties of reproduction functions needed for a uniform time measure. We show that the KRF meets conditions (serial additivity, rational divisibility) required for a 'weakly uniform' time scale.
Finally, we draw parallels between the problem of uniform time in psychophysics, and a formally similar problem occurring in the “kinematic relativity theory” [3,4]. Whether this parallelism is merely contingent or indicates a deeper “rationality of Nature” will be left as a subject for speculation.
[1] J. Wackermann, W. Ehm, J. Späti, in B. Berglund,
E. Borg (eds.), Fechner Day 2003,
Intl. Society for Psychophysics, Larnaca, (2003): 331-336.
[2] J. Wackermann, W. Ehm, J. Theor. Biol. (2006) 239: 482-493.
[3] G.J. Whitrow: Quart. J. Math. (Oxford) (1935) 6: 249-260.
[4] E.A. Milne, G.J. Whitrow: Z. Astrophys. (1938) 10: 263-298.
